Banks are the most important …nancial intermediaries and major providers of institutionalized loan …nancing in the economic systems worldwide. Externalities of their activities a¤ ect the economy deeply. Therefore, regulation of their behavior is of utmost importance for the general public. In addition, national and supranational prudential authorities request various forms and extents of mandatory disclosure. Nevertheless, voluntary disclosure is being recognized by the banks as a mechanism of asymmetric expectations'reduction and con…dence enhancement of current and potential both shareholders and stakeholders. Upgrading information availability and updating its quality might be a useful way of reducing the probability of systemic banking crisis as well as a useful tool for improving market discipline. However, the causes and consequences of banks' disclosure of accounting and other information are still challengeable issues in …nan-cial literature. In that regard, the purpose of the paper is to explore the determinants of Croatian banks' online disclosure of …nancial information. Bank speci…c and industry speci…c factors of disclosure are being empirically examined using univariate and multivariate statistical methods. Further research objective is to compare the volume and the structure of mandatory disclosed information using content analysis. It is expected that banks with higher transparency achieve signi…cantly better …nancial performance. However, the paper does not empirically investigate bene…ts or drawbacks of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. For all the aforementioned reasons the paper might be provide useful insights for academics, students of economics and, most of all, for the general public, especially depositors as major providers of bank funds.
INTRODUCTION
Increased …nancial transparency of banks and rise of their website reporting has recently been fostered by the adoption of Basel II Standard, or more precisely, its third pillar on market discipline. Market discipline "is a regulatory mechanism that delegates the monitoring and disciplining task not only to the national and international regulators but also to the market participants whose wealth is a¤ected by the banks'conduct" (Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003, 753) . It refers to "the way in which holders of bank liabilities, such as subordinated debt or uninsured deposits, 'punish'banks which take greater risks by demanding higher yields" (Baumman and Nier, 2003, 134) . Furthermore, e-transparency refers to the "level of corporate information disclosed on the internet" (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2006, 312) . It is expected that market disciplining will be mostly conducted by the subordinated debt holders and other fund holders non-covered by the deposit insurance systems (Bliss, 2001; Baumann and Nier, 2003; Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003; Herring, 2003) which lose their assets when the bank defaults, but "do not have any bene…ts of any upside gain when the bank takes excessive risk" (Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003, 754-755) . Their behavior could have signaling e¤ect mostly for the bank supervisors. In addition, Barth et al. (2002) empirically evidenced that the use of subordinated debt is strongly and positively connected with bank pro…tability which is supported by the data from more than 2 300 banks across 55 countries. This is why some authors reported …ndings on higher transparency regulation of banks as a substitute for the safety net creation (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2004) in order to prevent excessive risk taking by banks and occurrence of systemic crises. Moreover, governor Warsh (FED, Speech, 2010) has recently addressed the need for resurrection of market discipline as a complementary pillar of prudential regulation in order to reduce too-big-to-fail problem and use of the systemic risk exception. For the above outlined facts, supranational Basel recommendations in its third pillar seem to be consistent with the empirical evidence on the relevance of regulation level and type (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Barth et al., 2001a; Barth et al., 2001b; Nier, 2005; Tadesse, 2006) in prevention of banking crises and altering banking sector development. For example, in their cross-country analysis that included 107 countries in the period from 1998-2000, Barth et al. (2001b, 37) found out that "private monitoring is strongly positively linked with bank development and negatively associated with net interest margin and the level of nonperforming loans" while it is not statistically signi…cantly connected with banking crises. However, one of the most powerful evidences of the positive impacts of bank-disclosure requirements in prevention of banking crises is provided in Tadesse's (2006) cross-country analysis that encompassed 49 countries over the period from 1990-1997. These research results are consistent with those of Nier (2005) that were obtained from the sample of 550 listed banks across 32 countries over the years 1994-2000. Nevertheless, Basel II Standards only promote and encourage more market monitoring of bank behavior believing that market participants have su¢ cient initiative to act as a disciplining mechanism. Likewise Kalfaoglou and Sarris (2006, 5) concluded: "Pillar III seems to focus on the availability of information and little concern has been shown whether the interested parties gather, process and interpret information in a consistent and appropriate manner". In such a manner, governor Tarullo (FED, Speech, Tarullo, 2010, 3) summarized that "there is a little point Ana Kundid, Andrijana Rogosic -E-TRANSPARENCY OF CROATIAN BANKS: DETERMINANTS AND DISCLOSURE CONTENTS Economic Research -Ekonomska Istrazivanja Vol. 25, SE 1, 2012 Page:89 -and the potential for considerable unnecessary cost -in compelling disclosure of massive amounts of information that cannot be e¤ectively assimilated by investors and counterparties". Therefore, suggestions for enhancement of market supervision proposed by Herring (2003) should serve as the most complete framework that could be adopted by the prudential authorities in re-building safe and sound …nancial system. Expected results of regulation moving toward the "invisible-hand" discipline (Herring, 2003) should lead to more prudent behavior of banks, reduced intervention of banks into the safety net and circumvention of banking crises. However, the recent …nancial crisis demonstrated the insu¢ ciency of both regulatory and market supervision. Ine¢ ciency of market discipline might be a consequence of underdeveloped market disciplining, exaggerated con…dence in continuous market growth, self-destructive appetites of fund holders, their overreacted, synchronized actions or the quality of reported …nancial items. Thus, Baumann and Nier (2003) reported that the strength and e¤ectiveness of market discipline depends on the generosity of the safety net, on the level of bank's uninsured liabilities and the transparency of bank's risks. In that line, Warsh pointed out that "the growing specter of government support threatens to weaken market discipline, confuse price signals, and create a class of institutions that operate under di¤erent rules of the game"leading to "quasi-public"…nancial institutions (FED, Speech, Warsh, 2010, 2) . On the other hand, consequences and costs of bank runs caused by coordinated and excessive movements of disturbed creditors alter concern about e¢ ciency of market discipline that "has a tendency to become lax late in economic booms and excessively tight in busts" (FED, Speech, Warsh, 2010, 3) . With regard to this, Tadesse (2006, 33) summarized that the role of bank transparency in banking system stability is controversial and may result with positive informational externalities ("transparency-stability hypothesis") in the form of e¢ cient allocation of resources or negative informational externalities ("transparency-fragility hypothesis") in form of individual bank run, systemic crises and stock market collapse. For the above outlined reasons issues on the socially optimal bank disclosure are challengeable and rea¢ rmed in mature …nancial systems, both among supervisors and academics Page:90 Nier, 2003 and 2004; Nier, 2005; Kalfaoglou and Sarris, 2006; Tadesse, 2006; Alexandre et al., 2010 (Pervan, 2006; Pervan, 2009; Rogošić et al., 2008) . Moreover, the goal of this study is to evaluate disclosure content of the banks in Croatia in relation to their bank-speci…c characteristics. With respect to this, non-weighted disclosure indexes were built up in the paper, as dealt with in Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006) . In addition, Hossain (2008, 666 ) also implemented unweighted disclosure index methodology due to the notice that "the use of unweighted and weighted scores for the items disclosed in annual reports and accounts can make little or no di¤erence to the …ndings". However, whether the disclosure is bene…cial for banks and useful for market participants or banking system in its entirety is not intended to be answered in this paper, and is beyond its scope. Finally, Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006, 728) concluded that "the next phase of voluntary disclosure will be extended to other topics of concern such as information on environmental protection or intangible assets". Therefore, our future empirical research will follow up on this prognosis.
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INFORMATION AND EXPECTATIONS IN MAR-KET RELATIONS: THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTS
Why is public disclosure important in the market-based economy? Theoretical background on the relevance of public disclosure consists of few explanatory views. Theory of perfect competition and e¢ cient market hypothesis are the most rudimentary ones. According to the theory of perfect competition promoted by neoclassical economists, market transparency, as one of the underlying theoretical assumptions, is achieved if two preconditions are ful…lled (Pojatina, 2000, 143) . Firstly, information relevant for decision making should be distributed widely to the public and available at the lowest possible costs. Public disclosure can be mandatory or voluntary, free of charge or chargeable, self-disclosed by companies or disclosed by information intermediaries like credit rating agencies, …nancial analysts, investment advisors, auditors, …nancial press and supervisors. Therefore, private or market supervision of companies can be executed directly by investors or indirectly throughout information intermediaries ( Figure 1 ). Mandatory disclosure requirements should be particularly useful for investors as they turn information into the public good (Prescott, 2008) , reduce multiple costs and potential free-rider problem in information acquisition (Pojatina, 2004) . Secondly, market participants should be capable of using this data in their decision making. Hereafter, it needs to be noticed, as Baumann and Nier (2004, 31) Page:92 seems to overhaul more real and disputable research issues. It includes complementary empirical …ndings on the e¢ ciency of price e¤ects in the market with regard to the available information that are disclosed in a certain point of time (Pojatina, 2000, 181-185) . According to its conclusions market disciplining is done in relation to the past, present and future or predictable information and expectations of company's performance. Thus, asset prices are nearly always an accurate and unbiased assessment of disclosed information. Despite of the shortcomings of the aforementioned theories and their failures in explanation of certain price movements, "corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an e¢ cient capital market" (Healy and Palepu, 2001, 406) . FIGURE 1 Financial and information ‡ows in a capital market economy.
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Source: modi…ed according to : Healy, P.M. and Palepu, K.G. (2001) : Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31, 408. Healy and Palepu (2001, 405) summarized that "…nancial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate …rm performance and governance to outside investors"as well as to other stakeholders.
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What is the impulse to make private information publicly available, especially when there is possibility of their free riding by competitors? Theory of the …rm suggests that a reduction in informational asymmetries between company, their managers and investors in order to prevent adverse market response is the key reason. Informational asymmetries show up before and after the investment process and amplify the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, ex ante and ex post of the investment process, respectively. Thus, …rms disclose their information to distinguish themselves from less successful …rms, particularly in order to reduce "information" or "lemons" problem (Akerlof, 1970) , "agency problem" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ) and higher funding costs (Myers, 1984) . On the macroeconomic level, regulation prescribes minimal disclosure requirements in order to prevent systemic market failure in form of credit and equity rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) caused by fears, disappointments and actions of uninformed and unsophisticated investors. More precisely, according to the contemporary theory of …nancial intermediation (Bisignano, 1998; van Wensveen, 2000, 2003) that is applicable to the corporate …nance, asymmetrical expectations derived from asymmetrical information have pivotal role in investors' behavior (selection and monitoring of investments). Their risk management strategies or, so called, mechanisms of market discipline can be visible in price e¤ects (risk-return adjustments of investments), quantity e¤ects (additional investments, withdraw of funds, …re sales) and valuation techniques (changes in the market value). In addition, risk management strategies include several other techniques like adoption of restrictive clauses, required collaterals and guarantees as well as change of managerial structures. However, it should be noticed that public disclosure ex ante and ex post the investment decision is only one of the available tools that can be used in order to reduce asymmetrical information and thus asymmetrical expectations of the investors. Page:94 disclosure decisions and economic consequences of disclosure. Nevertheless, banks are extraordinarily opaque enterprises for their explicit and implicit fund holders due to information nature of their business and risks imposed by twofold imperfect information, between banks and their debtors as well as between banks and their creditors (Pojatina, 2004) . However, if the …nancial markets were perfect, banks would not exist at all, according to the traditional theory of …nancial intermediation Santomero, 1996, 1999) . As delegated managers, both by their shareholders and creditors, banks are nowadays required to disclose their …nancial and annual reports and qualitative information with purpose to preserve bank shareholders and stakeholders from potential losses, banking system from the appearance of systematic risk case and governments from unnecessary public costs. Quantitative and qualitative disclosures of bank performance should, thus, reduce both uncertainty and transactional costs of the interested parties. However, the most useful information on bank management based on supervisors o¤-site and on-site controls is forbidden for disclosure for both supervisors and the examined banks. Possible explanations of such practice are given by Prescott (2008, 2) : "the ability of a bank supervisor to accurately gauge the quality of a bank and the incentives of a bank to keep that information quiet in bad times are fundamental problems in bank regulation". If supervisor's ratings like CAMELS were disclosed, costs of cooperation of supervised banks to provide supervisor with information would increase with the consequences of either decreased quality of information that the supervisor receives or higher costs of collecting the information. This is why private companies like credit rating agencies have a strong incentive to in ‡ate the ratings of their clients. Furthermore, Herring (2003) warned about several areas of concern on the issue of e¢ ciency of market discipline in banking practice such as: lack of transparency, inadequate incentives to impose discipline of banks, biased prices and destabilizing ‡ows due to herd-like or mimetic behaviour of market participants, and market discipline that may not in ‡uence bank behavior, both ex ante and ex post of public disclosure. In addition, Kalfaoglou and Sarris (2006, 6) conclude that "the e¤ectiveness of the market discipline depends on three aspects, the bank's disclosure policy, the ability of the market participants Ana Kundid, Andrijana Rogosic -E-TRANSPARENCY OF CROATIAN BANKS: DETERMINANTS AND DISCLOSURE CONTENTS to assess bank's riskiness (ability to monitor) and the ability to impose discipline (ability to in ‡uence)". Therefore, direct costs of disclosure and potential indirect costs of disclosure, whether they are private (in form of cost of capital and market volatilities) or social costs (in form of …nancial system safety and soundness as well as …scal costs) should be taken into consideration when setting up macroprudential disclosure framework and individual bank disclosure policy.
INTERDEPENDENCE OF DISCLOSURE POLICY AND BANK PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL BACK-GROUND
Empirical examinations on the public disclosure have usually been executed in two directions: ex ante and ex post of mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Ex ante literature contains complementary explanations on the determinants of the level of public disclosure (Bonsón-Ponte et al., 2006; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2006; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Spiegel and Yamori, 2004) . Ex post analyses investigate the e¤ects of corporate reporting on market volatility and cost of capital in order to examine bene…ts and drawbacks of public disclosure for the banking …rm (Baumann and Nier, 2003; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Nier, 2005) . Taking into consideration the research scope of the paper, the …rst group of papers will serve as a building block for our research. Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006) performance was not statistically signi…cant to e-transparency due to demonstrated size-performance dependence in the model. Thus, in ‡uence of …nancial performance to online reporting is proved to be indirect. Hossain (2008) examined the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure for 38 listed banks in India in relation to selected bank-speci…c characteristics in the period [2002] [2003] . It turned out that selected banks on average disclose 60 % of overall observed disclosure contents out of which 88 % are mandatory and 25 % are voluntary items. Bank size variable as well as pro…tability, credit risk, own funds …nancing and board composition proved out to be statistically signi…cantly connected with disclosure index, whilst bank age, complexity of business and assets-in-place proved irrelevant for disclosure index explanation. Estimated parameters were positive for bank size, pro…tability and board composition while for non-performing loans and capital adequacy ratio they were negative. In addition, previously Hossain and Reaz (2007) provided empirical evidence that diversi…cation and multiple exchange listing do not a¤ect bank voluntary disclosure for the same sample of banks. Spiegel and Yamori (2004) analyzed the determinants of voluntary disclosure by Japanese Shinkin banks 1 for the 1996 and 1997 and provided empirically evidenced justi…cation for mandatory disclosures that followed. On the data sample of slightly less than 400 Shinkin bank, the hypothesis that the poorly capitalized, small banks operating in less competitive markets with weak credit risk policies avoid voluntary disclosures on non-performing loans issue, was veri…ed. Baumann and Nier (2004) set up empirical evidence for the relationship between the volatility of bank's stock price and the amount of information the bank discloses to the market. They reported that higher level of disclosure content (measured with disclosure index) reduces stock volatility as it was ex-1 Shinkin banks "are relatively small …nancial institutions that are privately held by members living or operating near a bank's headquarters" (Speigel and Yamori, 2004, p. 6) . These mutual credit associations mostly …nance small and medium size enterprises and can grant a maximum of 20 % of their loans to non-members. Deposits can be accepted both from members and non-members. pected. Thus, information disclosure may be useful to investors and banks. The research was conducted on the data from about 600 banks across 31 countries over the period 1993-2000. However its limitations are related to the use of averaged bank data. Previously, Baumann and Nier (2003) also evidenced on the e¤ect of market discipline on bank risk-taking. They concluded that the level of capital bu¤ers that are proxies for bank's ultimate risk absorption are weakened with adverse e¤ects of deposit insurance systems while strengthened by larger interbank deposit …nancing and higher disclosure indexes. Thus, market discipline may reduce banks´incentives to increase their risk pro…le. Finally, Nier (2005) veri…ed that net e¤ects of bank disclosure, as di¤erence between ex post (reduced market volatility and banking system stability) and ex ante effects (prevention of excessive risk taking) substantially contribute to prevention of banking crises.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF BANK FINANCIAL REPORTING
Convergence in regulation of banking business has moved into the direction of promoting market discipline. Supranational prudential regulation conducted mainly by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision stressed the importance of public disclosure of the internationally active banks. Thus, the third pillar of Basel proposals is focused on market discipline and is complementary with the minimum capital requirements (…rst pillar) and supervisory review process (second 3) "credit institution is obliged to disclose its revised non-consolidated …nancial statements together with its annual report on its websites and is obliged to make them available at the latest within …ve months since the end of business year for which they are related to". The Act prescribes additional requests related to this issue in form of organization of internal control system that must have a function of monitoring compliance in order to manage compliance risk. Croatian National Bank has a right to charge penalty from 500 000 to 2 000 000 HRK for not ful…lling these disclosure requirements. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INTERNET DIS-CLOSURE IN CROATIN BANKING SEC-TOR 4.1 HYPOTHESES
Accounting information relevant to economic decision-making is available in the fundamental …nancial statements. Since the Internet disclosure of …nan-cial statements and Annual report is obligatory for banks in Croatia, the …rst hypothesis is therefore as follows: H1: Banks in the Republic of Croatia generally disclose mandatory …nancial statements and annual report on their websites in which small banks publish less information. According to the results of the previous researches (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2006; Hossain, 2008) it is expected that more pro…table banks are more willing to disclose their …nancial results on the Internet in order to distinguish themselves from their competitors on su¢ ciently competitive market. Self-disclosure on good rather than adverse news is expected to be proved with the second hypothesis:
H2: Bank pro…tability is positively related to voluntary …nancial reporting. Since larger banks have a wider …nancial public (among all the mentioned reasons), the assumption is that the bank size is statistically signi…cantly related to the level of voluntary and mandatory disclosure, likewise proved in Spiegel and Yamori (2004) (2007) and Hossain (2008) . One of the possible explanations is that "large …rms need to raise capital in the market more frequently and are under great pressure from shareholders and market analysts for increased disclosures" (Spiegel and Yamori, 2004, 11) . Thus, large banks are more oriented towards subordinated debt than deposit based smaller banks and should therefore publicly disclose more data in order to reduce total cost of capital. Bearing in mind the above, the third hypothesis is: H3: Bank size determines level of public disclosure. Hence, the latter hypothesis might provoke the question of the existence of structure-conduct performance or e¢ ciency structure hypothesis that relates bank market share to its pro…tability, whereas large banks are more pro…table due to their higher market concentration or their e¢ ciency in providing services. Thus, bank size could determine its level of disclosure indirectly through a¤ecting its pro…tability as proved in Serrano-Cinca et al. (2006) . Furthermore, higher capital adequacy ratio as an internationally accepted indicator of bank stability should be negatively related to the volume of disclosed information, likewise in Hossain (2008) . However it is questionable whether this is caused with lower monitoring or bankruptcy costs or the fact that large banks can hold smaller amounts of own funds as they are too-big-to-fail and have better risk management practices including higher diversi…cation opportunities. Therefore, the …nal hypothesis is:
H4: The level of Croatian banks e-transparency is determined by market share and capital adequacy.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The research is focused on the banking sector operating in Croatia and includes all 32 banks. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure of …nancial and non-…nancial information on the Internet was monitored twice, in September 2010 and in October 2010. According to the Credit Institution Act, banks should have published their …nancial statements and annual report on their o¢ cial websites by the end of May 2010 but our empirical study carried out during September 2010 showed that …ve small banks did not disclose basic accounting information.
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The situation regarding obligatory reporting improved in October 2010 when three banks had no fundamental …nancial statements disclosed. The practice of Internet …nancial reporting shows that annual report usually contains the Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash Flow Statement, Report of changes in equity and Notes to the …nancial statements as well as mentioned mandatory information typical for this report. It must be emphasized that the main content of the annual reports for the year 2009 of Croatian banks are …nancial statements but the extent of disclosure of required elements is heterogeneous and the subject of this study.
THE SELECTION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ITEMS
In order to determine disclosure level unweighted (scoring) indexes were used. Those indexes are calculated to determine the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure of banks. Mandatory items are the elements of annual report required by Accounting Act, and are as follows:
1. important events that have occurred since the end of the …nancial year (mi1), 2. the company's likely future development (mi2), 3. activities in the …eld of research and development (mi3), 4. the information concerning acquisitions of own shares, existence of a subsidiary companies (mi4), 5. existence of a subsidiary (or subsidiaries) (mi5), 6. information on used …nancial instruments if it is important for assessing the …nancial position and business performance (mi6), 7. goals and policies related to companies´ability to manage …nancial risk, together with the policy of protection of any signi…cant forecast transaction for which protection is used (mi7), Voluntary disclosure index contains: 1) general corporate information (such as brief narrative history of the Bank, basic organization structure/chart/description of corporate structure, addresses, general description of business activities), 2) information on corporate governance (details about the chairman like academic, professional and business experience, the same details about the members of the Board of Directors and the members of supervisory board) and 3) information on …nancial performance (graphical presentation of performance indicators, pro…tability ratios like return on asset and return on equity, capital adequacy ratio, asset growth, revenue growth, pro…t growth, and the information on methodology of calculation of all these …nancial ratios)
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted in three stages. First, existence of …nancial and annual reports published on banks'web sites was researched. Observation and thus data collection was made in September and October of 2010. In this period due to the ful…lling obligations regarding the Decision on the public disclosure of creditworthiness requirements of credit institutions, banks reporting pro…les changed. Second, di¤erences in content of annual reports were examined following Accounting Act and Credit Institutions Act. reports, like information on …nancial performance, but this study included also the information published on banks'o¢ cial websites. Data regarding banks'market share, capital adequacy ratio, total asset, pro…t and loss amount in 2009 are taken from the Croatian National Bank´website and are considered as independent variables in this research.
RESEARCH RESULTS
ON BANKS'COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATORY PROPO-SITIONS
The …rst observation showed that small banks that operate at loss are the ones that did not publish any annual report or …nancial statement. Correlation between online reporting and …nancial result is 0,368 and signi…cant at the 0,05 level. Among all required elements of annual report (observed in October 2010), the information on …nancial instruments and …nancial risk management are the most transparent (87,5 %) due to demands of both Acts (Table 1) . Source: Authors' calculation. The least frequently published mandatory items are ones regarding Code of Corporate Governance and important events that have occurred since the end of the …nancial year (published only by 11 banks).
Statistically signi…cant correlation between bank size and mandatory disclosure index (r = 0,389; Sig.= 0,028) suggests that small banks disclose less information than required in the annual report (Table 2) . Source: Authors' calculation. On the other hand, large banks are more transparent regarding their research Ana Kundid, Andrijana Rogosic -E-TRANSPARENCY OF CROATIAN BANKS: DETERMINANTS AND DISCLOSURE CONTENTS and development activities (Table 3) as well as their plans for the future development (Table 4) . Page:106
ON DETERMINANTS OF BANKS' DISCLOSURE CON-TENTS
The disclosure of …nancial performance information is tested by Mann-Whitney U-test assuming that pro…table banks are more transparent in that context (Tables 5 and 6 ). Source: Authors' calculation. The second hypothesis can be considered as valid since there is statistically signi…cant di¤erence in …nancial performance disclosure ranks between banks that have made pro…ts and those which recorded losses. As already noted, bank size can be related to e-transparency. To con…rm the third hypothesis, One way ANOVA test was performed (Tables 7 and 8) . Source: Authors' calculation. Table 7 shows that large banks have mean value of public disclosure rated as 21,17 and small banks as 13,78. The di¤erence in public disclosure index between large, medium and small banks is statistically signi…cant (sig.= 0,015) so the third hypothesis can be accepted. In Croatia, pro…tability, bank size and foreign ownership are correlated (Table 9) * Correlation is signi…cant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is signi…cant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). Source: Authors' calculation. The following linear regression model is to be …tted into the data in order to assess the e¤ect of market share and capital adequacy ratio on the general disclosure level: Y = ß 0 + ß 1 x 1 + ß 2 x 2 + e (1) where Y is total disclosure rank received for each bank, ß 0 is the intercept, E is error term, x 1 is market share and x 2 is capital adequacy ratio.
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2) The mentioned model shows that if market share increases by 1 %, general disclosure rank (mandatory and voluntary information included) can be improved by 0,093 and if capital adequacy ration decreases by 1%, general disclosure rank can be improved by 0,058. Comparing scoring indexes of mandatory and voluntary information (Table 13) , it can be stated that banks with good practice of mandatory disclosure are more transparent about their …nancial performance, corporate governance and other general business information. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Online disclosure of …nancial and annual reports of banks in the Republic of Croatia is highly aligned to the requests of domestic prudential authorities in which websites are obligatory form of presenting …nancial information. However, some banks still do not ful…ll their legal obligation for internet reporting as is being requested by the Credit Institutions Act since 2009. Furthermore, heterogeneity of the level of disclosure content can be explained with some bankspeci…c indicators. According to the results obtained, large banks (measured with market share), banks with higher pro…tability and lower capital adequacy ratio have higher both mandatory and voluntary disclosure indexes. Thus, banks with the previously mentioned attributes use their websites to the wider extent for voluntary …nancial performance disclosure, probably to di¤erentiate themselves from those that are less successful and less transparent. If additional bank performance indicators were publicly available, more detailed analysis could be obtained. However, correlations presented in the research results do not imply the causality of the selected variables. In addition, quantity of disclosed data does not imply their quality although it is expected that these two should be positively correlated. Still, disclosures indexes do not necessarily indicate lower level of web transparency and mandatory compliance due to non existence of some required data in practice of an individual bank. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the unity and compliance of statistical and economic signi…cance on the determinants of bank disclosure level is achieved, as well as the consistency with some of the mentioned empirical researches and research hypotheses. Although requirements for higher e-transparency is consistent with the goal of promoting more intensive market discipline, identi…cation of potential pitfalls and blunders of such regulatory policies can not be omitted. Some of them are being discussed in the introductory section of the paper and are common for both developed and developing countries. The key question is who will use the disclosed data and how …nancial public will interpret them. Thus, higher disclosure level might imply more volatility in the volume and structure Page:112 of bank fund holders as well as in stock prices. In case of bad publicity and disclosure de…ciency of some banks it can lead to an extreme situation of bank run. Hereafter, it should be noticed that public disclosure requirements put small banks in Croatia in unfavorable position due to their continuously weaker performance than banks that are either bigger than the bank in question. Thus, in order to decrease possibility of misuse of online reports a special (separate) bank report for depositors that are generally non sophisticated fund holder could be required for website disclosure by Croatian National Bank. The Board of directors should be responsible for this report. In addition, due to heterogeneity of annual reports which reduce their comparability even among the peers it is expected that this should also be standardized report as well. Research on the web tra¢ c of banks in Croatia was not considered in the research and even if it were, it could not be understood as the ultimate measure of the use of the presented data. However, it could be assumed that despite of the promotion of the "invisible hand" mechanism by the regulatory requirements, disclosure e¤orts still outweigh wider use and bene…ts of the disclosed data, at least in the Republic of Croatia, where more than 90 % of depositors are protected by the deposit insurance system while subordinated debt holders are marginal in …nancial sources and are mostly parent banks.
